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Abstract
Decision-makers can learn from their own past experience, and, potentially, from
the experience of other decision-makers who face similar problems. When experience
is private information, communication is necessary to learn from others. In a two-
period model in which decision-makers care about their reputation, we study how
the assignment of decision rights (who decides on the actions taken in period two?)
and the information on which reputations are based determine (i) the willingness to
share information, (ii) decisions, and (iii) welfare. Centralizing decision rights may
hurt welfare due to the negative e¤ect on the quality of communication. The welfare
e¤ects of reputation depend on whether perceptions of a decision-makers ability are
based solely on his own action or on comparisons across decision-makers, and on the
assignment of decision rights.
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Changing on the basis of new evidence means accepting the uncomfortable notion that
we [doctors] did it wrong, or less well, before. Thus we needlessly harmed people in the past.
This is painful for health professionals, (...) even if our actions were unintentional or the
evidence didnt exist previously. Some nd it easy to say Well, better stop harming now than
carry on,but denial is simpler, powerful, and comforting1
1 Introduction
Learning from ones own experience and learning from others are two important ways in
which decision-makers can improve the decisions they take over time. It may help a physician
in identifying a better intervention for a patient with a given diagnosis; it may help police in
establishing a more e¤ective way of criminal investigative analysis; it can help organizational
divisions in establishing what customer-relationship management system works best, etc.
The challenge in each case is to recognize the best course of action and to ensure its di¤usion.
In practice, the identication and di¤usion of the best course of action raise two main
problems. First, it has been established that once a decision-maker has chosen a course of
action, he tends to cling to it, even if subsequently his own experience shows that another
action would likely result in a better outcome.2 One important reason for this behaviour
has been put forward by, e.g., Kanodia et al. (1989), and Prendergast and Stole (1996):
the presence of reputational concerns. Changing course of action amounts to an admission
that the previous action was inappropriate. As a result, a change a¤ects perceptions of the
ability of the decision-maker adversely. A decision-maker who wants to acquire a reputation
for identifying the correct action, will be hesitant to change. The second problem is that
learning from decision-makers located at other sites (hospitals, states, divisions etc.) is not
automatic, but requires their willingness to share their private information. Reputational
concerns may make communication strategic.
In this paper, we study how reputational concerns inuence the quality of learning from
others. We present a simple two-period model of learning. In period one, each agent at
1Susan Bewley, consultant obstetrician, in Getting to the bottom of evidence based medicine, the British
Medical Journal, April 5, 2008.
2See, e.g., Thaler (1980).
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his own site is confronted with a common problem, and receives a private signal. The
informativeness of the signal is determined by the agents ability at identifying the better
course of action. Unaware that others are struggling with the same problem, each agent
optimally follows his private signal, and next privately learns the true, common value of the
chosen course of action. It may be that agents receive the same signal. The outcome of
period one is a historical patternof actions taken to address the common problem.
Next, decisions have to be made as to the action to adopt in period two. An agent may
rely only on his own experience the case studied in Prendergast and Stole. But if there is
an awareness that other agents have addressed the same problem, it might be benicial to
make use of their experience. This requires communication about locally gained experience.
Inspired by real world examples that we discuss below, our analysis focuses on two dimensions
that may inuence the quality of learning.
(i) Second period decision rights. Do local agents keep the authority to decide in period
two (decentralized learning), or is it in the hands of some centerthat decides what actions
are taken at the di¤erent sites (centralized learning)? In the rst case, communication is
horizontal, among the local agents. In the latter case, communication is vertical, from local
agents to the center.
(ii) Information on which the perception of a local agents ability is based. As in Pren-
dergast and Stole, we assume that perceptions are based on observed actions only, not the
values these actions generate, but we distinguish two cases. The perception of an agents
ability is either based on the actions taken at his site (locally determined reputations), or on
the actions taken at all sites (globally determined reputations). In the latter case, compar-
isons across sites become possible, thanks to, e.g., increased transparency. As highly able
agents are more likely to initially take the same action than less able ones, such comparisons
may a¤ect perceptions.
We assume that the utility of a local agent is increasing in the value of the action taken
at his site and his end-of-period reputation, and that the centre (e.g. a health care body, the
head of the police force, corporate headquarters) only cares about the value of the actions
taken. We compare various learning environments (as characterized by the two dimensions
just mentioned) in terms of the ex ante expected value of the actions taken in period two
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(welfare). As there may be conicts of interest between local agents, and between local
agents and the center communication about the experiences gained is strategic. The only
formal mechanism in place are the decision rights in period two. In particular, a decision-
maker cannot commit to make use of the information he will receive in a specic way. As a
result, communication about the privately gained experience amounts to cheap talk.
The goal of this paper is to further our understanding of learning processes by establishing
how (i) the assignment of decision rights and (ii) the information on which perceptions
of abilities are based jointly determine the willingness of decision-makers to share private
information, the quality of the decisions taken conditional on the information transmitted,
and overall welfare.
As said, in practice the identication and di¤usion of the best course of action can be
a struggle. Consider the medical profession. The delivery of medical interventions varies
widely from place to place.3 This variation has been a source of worries as, most likely,
some patients do not receive optimal treatment.4 It also o¤ers scope for learning. In re-
sponse, physicians associations and health care authorities have exerted much e¤ort to
design learning processes in which locally gained experiences are compared, and best prac-
tices interventions, surgical procedures, drug use di¤used. In the medical sector, expert
panels are frequently used to evaluate the evidence on the e¤ectiveness of rival practices
in a given eld. Given the close ties between experts and industry, and the long gestation
period that characterizes the development of practices, experts tend to have vested interests
and to identify with certain practices. The result, according to students of expert panels, is
process lossdue to reputational concerns, leading in turn to poor information exchange
and aggregation in the meetings, and a low adoption rate of best practices afterwards.5
Organizing these panels is therefore fraught with problems. An important organizational
dimension is the degree of centralization of the process and, relatedly, the degree of freedom
individual physicians have in following the outcomes of panel meetings.6 It also seems that
the IT revolution and increased information dissemination over the internet, in combination
3That variation is large is a well-established fact, see Phelps (2000).
4See, e.g., Eddy (1990).
5See Fink et al. (1984) and Rowe et al. (1991).
6Eddy (1990) distinguishes, in increasing degree of freedom, standards, guidelines, and options.
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with societal pressure to increase transparency makes it easier for patients and authorities
to compare medical practices across places. This information can then shape the perception
of physiciansabilities.
The European Union is another case in point. It has been promoting the so-called open
method of coordination (OMC) to foster learning and the di¤usion of best practices in many
policy areas. The hope is that goals like EU competitiveness can be furthered by avoiding the
grand questions about the best model for Europe and by taking instead a more pragmatic
micro-orientation in which countries that face similar problems seek to learn from each other.7
Rather than relying on legislation by Brusselsa form of centralized decision-making, the
OMC leaves decision rights with the EU countries: they decide whether to implement the
lessons learned. Moreover, instead of applying formal sanctions to transgressors, the OMC
turns to naming and shaming to expose a countrys weak performance in public, and applies
peer pressure if a country opposes adoption of superior policies.8 In practice, the method
is not considered to be very successful in guaranteeing a high quality learning process. It
is generally felt that countries exaggerate the success of their current practices. Also, the
implementation of new ideas is very limited. Claudio Radaelli (2003, p. 12) argues that these
disappointing results stem from a misguided view of policy makers among the proponents
of the OMC. Rather than caring about the truth, they care about political capitaland
prestigeforms of reputational concerns. Arguably, the naming and shaming in public
suggests that the perception of an agents ability in the case of the OMC can be based on
comparisons across countries.
We obtain the following results. Our model replicates one of the nding of Prendergast
and Stole: if an agent cannot communicate with another agent but has to decide what
course of action to take in complete isolation and on the basis of his own experience only,
then reputational concerns make him conservative.9 This conservatism implies a loss of
welfare that is growing in the degree to which the agent cares about his perceived ability.
7Policy areas where the OMC has been applied in areas as diverse as employment, social inclusion,
innovation, education, occupational health and safety.
8See Pochet (2005) and Radaelli (2003).
9As ours is a binary-choice model, we cannot replicate the second main nding of Prendergast and Stole,
namely that early on a decision-maker reacts too strongly to information to boost his reputation.
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If learning from others is possible and happens in a decentralized way, an agent remains
conservative to protect his reputation. The information on which he can base his second
period decision is partly gained from own experience and from what others are willing to share
with him. The quality of information exchange is high if reputations are locally determined.
He can only gain by listening to others, and has nothing to loose by truthfully revealing his
own experience, as his reputation does not depend on the action that others adopt in period
two. If instead reputations are determined globally, his reputation is particularly strong if
others start to adopt his initial course of action. As a result, communication becomes
strategic: it becomes important for an agent to convince others that his technology is
best. We show that communication breaks down completely. Interestingly, the fact that an
agent has less information on which to base his second period decision does not by itself
mean that welfare goes down. This is also determined by the reputational gain of distorting
the decision. Essentially, if there is more information on which the agent bases his decision,
there is also more information about his ability that can be gleaned from that decision. We
derive an intuitive condition that species when the additional information shared among
agents next leads to an increase or decrease in welfare.
Second period decision-making in case of a centralized process does not su¤er from con-
servatism as, by assumption, the center only cares about welfare. But the center depends
on the agents to provide him with information. An agent now faces a trade-o¤. On the one
hand, as the agent has no decision-making power, he wants to make sure that the center
is well-informed. On the other hand, his reputational concerns imply that he wants the
center to impose his technology at either site. In equilibrium, each agent sends coarse
information about his own practice. This has a number of consequences. First, replacing
a decentralized process by a centralized one reduces the quality of information exchange if
reputations are locally determined. We derive the conditions under which the quality of
information exchange in case of a centralized process becomes so poor that it o¤sets the
improved decision-making conditional on information. Second, if reputations are globally
determined, replacing a decentralized process by a centralized one improves communication.
In fact, a centralized process creates more welfare than a decentralized one in case repu-
tations are based on comparisons across sites. We show that communication between the
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agents and the center never vanishes, for any nite weight the agents put on their reputa-
tions. Finally, we derive conditions under which, in case of centralized process, welfare goes
up if locally based reputations give way to globally based reputations.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section discusses the related literature. In
Section 3, we present the model. Section 4 analyses isolated agents, a benchmark situation
in which agents can learn from their own past experience only. In section 5 we analyse
decentralized learning, with local and global markets. In section 6 we perform the same
analysis for centralized learning. Section 7 contains the comparisons. Section 8 concludes.
2 Related Literature
Our paper is related to a number of literatures.
(1) Information processing when information is dispersed. Our paper is closest
related to Alonso, Dessein, and Matouschek (2008) and to Rantakari (2008). They study
the desirability of a centralized or decentralized process in the context of a multidivisional
rm. Each division benets from adapting its decision to its own market circumstances
and from coordinating its decision with those of the other divisions. Divisions are privately
informed about their market circumstances. They can either exchange information and next
decide independently of each other what decisions to take or they can report information
to headquarters which then decides for both divisions. They show that even if coordination
becomes of overriding concern to the rm, a decentralized process may still outperform a
centralized process due to the di¤erence in quality of communication.10 As Alonso et al.
and Rantakari we study the e¤ect of the assignment of decision rights on the quality of
communication and of the nal decisions taken. The situation we analyse, however, is quite
di¤erent. In our paper, there are no local circumstances to which a decision should ideally
be adapted, nor is there a need to coordinate per se. Instead, there is room for learning from
each others past experience (to identify the better course of action), resistance to change
10Friebel and Raith (2010) study how the scope of the rm a¤ects the quality of strategic information
transmission between a division and head quarters.
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(because of reputational concerns), and possibly the desire to convince other agents to adopt
ones initial course of action (again, due to reputational concerns).
The importance of dispersed information has already been highlighted in debates on the
relative merits of a planning economy and a market economy in the 1930s, see e.g. Hayek
(1945). Team theory, as developed by Marshak and Radner (1972), is one of the rst formal
attempts to address the question how an organization should be structured to deal optimally
with dispersed information. In this theory, interests of organizational members are perfectly
aligned, and so incentive problems do not arise. Instead, the focus is on exogenously specied
communication and information-processing constraints. In our paper, we focus on the e¤ect
of agentsinterests on their willingness to share information. We share with the mechanism
design literature a focus on the incentive problems surrounding communication. However, we
do not assume that agents can commit to mechanisms. Only decision rights can be assigned.
As a result, an important implication of the Revelation Principle, that a centralized process
is always at least as good as a decentralized one, does not hold.11
There are other papers in economics and political science that explore how characteristics
of decision-making processes inuence the quality of cheap talk communication.12. The
current paper di¤ers from the existing literature in its focus on the possibilities for learning
from ones own experience and from the experience of others in a context where agents have
reputational concerns.
(2) Reputational concerns. The e¤ect of reputational or career concerns has been studied
in various environments. Holmstrom (1999) studies the incentives such concerns give to exert
productive e¤ort if there is uncertainty about an agents ability level. If there is uncertainty
about an agents ability to reador predict the state of the world one speaks of expert
models. Experts use the recommendations that they give, the implementation decision that
11See Mookherjee (2006) and Poitevin (2000) for excellent surveys of the assumptions underlying the
Revelation Principle. They also discuss various modelling strategies that can be used to explain why decen-
tralization and delegation outperform centralization.
12In economicss see e.g. Dessein (2002, 2007), Visser and Swank (2007), Alonso et al. (2008), Rantakari
(2008), and Friebel and Raith (2010). In political science, see e.g., Gilligan and Krehbiel (1987), Austen-
Smith (1990), Coughlan (2000), and Austen-Smith and Feddersen (2005).
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they take, or the e¤ort they exert to convince the market of their expertise.13 Part of this
expert literature looks at the e¤ects of information disclosure (transparency) about an
experts actions and about the outcomes of decisions.14 The present paper is related to that
literature, as the information on which an agents reputation is based can change, either by
design or by some external force, from specic to his site to involving comparisons across
sites. We show that as a result of the additional information, communication is destroyed in
case of a decentralized process, but improves in case of a centralized process. That is, the
same form of transparency may give rise to very di¤erent e¤ects depending on the institutions
in which it is introduced.
(3) Laboratory federalism and policy di¤usion.15 In an interesting recent paper,
Volden, Ting, and Carpenter (2008) study what happens if policy makers trade o¤ pol-
icy e¤ectiveness at solving problems and political preferences. They compare the adoption
patterns of states that act independently and learn from their own past performance at ad-
dressing common problems with the patterns that arise if states learn from each other. Our
focus is di¤erent from theirs as we study the quality of information exchange among decision-
makers, compare centralized and decentralized decision-making, and study the e¤ect of the
informational basis of reputations.
(4) Learning. We already mentioned the seminal paper by Prendergast and Stole (2006) on
learning from ones own observations by an agent who also cares about his perceived ability.
Compared to their paper, we introduce learning from others, and hence communication, a
discussion of decision rights, and di¤erent information sets on which perceptions of ability can
be based. Our paper is also related to some existing literature on learning from others. This
literature is, however, methodologically quite di¤erent from ours. In the existing literature,
it is assumed that either an agent observes the true value of the actions taken by others,
13Scharfstein and Stein (1990) and Ottaviani and Sorensen (2001, 2006) deal with the advice given by
experts. Milbourn et al (2001) and Suurmond et al. (2004), deal with the projects an expert implements
and the e¤ort he exerts to become informed.
14See Suurmond et al. (2004) and Prat (2005) in a single-agent setting, and Levy (2007) and Swank and
Visser (2009) in a committee setting.
15See Oates (1999) for a survey.
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whether the environment is strategic16 or not17, or that no such information is observed
at all18. Furthermore, inertia or conservatism is an exogenous factor. For example, in the
literature on word-of-mouth communication, it is assumed that only a given fraction of agents
updates its decisions once new information becomes available. In our paper both the quality
of the information exchange and the degree of inertia are equilibrium outcomes. Were it
not for the reputational concerns, the problem the agents are facing in our model, that of
choosing one technology out of many, is similar to a common value bandit problem in which
the bandits arms represent the technologies of unknown, but common, value.19 The main
di¤erence is that in a bandit problem the distribution of the value of a technology does not
change with an observation of the value of another technology, whereas in our problem it
does. This stems from the fact that in our model the initial signal an agent receives provides
information about the better technology. The higher is the observed value of a technology
Y , the higher is the probability that the agent identied the better technology. And this
means that it becomes more likely that the value of the other technology is lower than the
actual value of Y .
The fact that in our model the quality of information exchange and the degree of iner-
tia are endogenous, and that a key assumption of the statistical bandit model is violated
imply that a general analysis of the asymptotic behaviour of the decision-making processes
described here is di¢ cult and beyond the scope of this paper. Instead, we compare the
16See the discussion of social learning in a strategic experimentation game in Bergemann and Välimäki
(2006). In this literature, it is assumed that an agent perfectly observes both the technology others use and
the true value they obtain. It is not clear that an agent, if he could, would not want to deviate from a
strategy of truthfully revealing the value of the technology he has gained experience with. It seems that he
would benet from exaggerating the value as this would make adoption by others more likely. As a result,
more (public) information would become available about this technology, and the deviator would benet
from an improved estimate of the technologys value.
17See Bala and Goyal (1998) for a model of learning in non-strategic networks, and Ellison and Fudenberg
(1993, 1995) and Banerjee and Fudenberg (2004) for analyses of word-of-mouth communication in non-
strategic environments.
18In the literature on informational herding, communication between decision-makers is excluded although
the environment in non-strategic. See e.g. Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer and Welch (1998). See Çelen, Kariv
and Schotter (2008) for a rst experimental analysis of social learning from actions and advice.
19See Bergemann and Välimäki (2006) for a concise survey of bandit problems.
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behaviour of agents across various decision-making processes in a two-period setting.
(5) Cheap talk. In their seminal paper, Crawford and Sobel (1982) show that cheap talk
between an informed sender and an uninformed receiver (decision-maker) can be informative,
and that the quality of information exchange depends on the degree of alignment between
the interests of both parties. In Crawford and Sobel, and in the literature on cheap talk
in general, the degree of alignment is exogenously given. In our model, by contrast, it is
determined in equilibrium. The reason is that senders are concerned with their reputations.
These reputations are determined in equilibrium. A consequence is that, as we show below,
in case of a centralized process and reputations based on comparisons across sites, cheap talk
remains informative for any nite weight that agents put on their reputation.
3 A model of learning from own experience and learn-
ing from others with reputational concerns.
There are two sites (hospitals, states, etc.), i 2 f1; 2g, and one problem. There is an agent i
at each site. Often, j will denote the other siteor the other agent,j 6= i. The problem
has to be addressed at each site both in period t = 1 and in t = 2. There are two possible
technologies (policies, interventions, etc.) X 2 fY; Zg, one of which has to be used to
address the problem at each site in each period. The technology adopted at site i in period t
is denoted by Xi;t. A priori, the value of technology X is unknown, but independent of time
and site. It is a random draw from a continuous and strictly increasing distribution function
FX () and associated density function fX (), with support [0; 1]. Note that we use X both
to denote a technology and its random value. We assume that the values of technologies Y
and Z are iid, FY = FZ = F . We use lower case letters, like x, to denote a possible value
(realization) of the value of technology X, such that x 2 [0; 1]. As strategies will be dened
in terms of X (or x), it will be useful to let XC (or xC) refer to the other technology.
That is, if X = Y , then XC = Z, etc.
The agentsability levels i 2

; 
	
and the state of the world (y; z) 2 [0; 1]2 are exoge-
nously given. The ability levels and the state of the world are all statistically independent,
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with  = Pr
 
i = 
 2 (0; 1) for i 2 f1; 2g.
At the beginning of period t = 1, agent i at site i receives a private, non-veriable,
signal si 2

sY ; sZ
	
about which technology solves the problem best. The informativeness
of the signal depends on the agents ability: Pr
 
sX jx > xC ;  = 1, Pr  sX jxC > x;  = 0,
Pr
 
sX jx > xC ;  = Pr  sX jxC > x;  = 1=2, for X 2 fY; Zg. That is, if i is highly able,
i = , the signal reveals with probability one the better technology: Pr
 
x > xC jsX ;  = 1
forX 2 fY; Zg. Hence, conditional on sX and  = , X is distributed as the maximum of two
iid random variables, FX
 
xjsX ;  = F (x)2. On the other hand, if i is less able, i = , the
signal is uninformative about the relative quality of the technology: FX
 
xjsX ;  = F (x).
Note that an agent does not get a signal about his ability. Instead,  is the common prior.20
Still in period 1, i next decides which technology X to adopt on the basis of his signal si.
At the end of the period he learns the value x of the chosen technology.
At this point, it is worth emphasizing that the focus of our analysis will be on period
2. As mentioned in the introduction, we intend to understand the pros and cons of alterna-
tive learning processes in situations where (i) agents have gained experiences with di¤erent
technologies, treatments, or policies and (ii) there is scope for learning from others. In our
model, period 1 can be interpreted as the history in which agents gained information. We
model history to stress that past decisions matter for current decisions, for example, through
reputational concerns.
We distinguish three learning processes p that characterize period t = 2. Such a process
consists of a decision-making stage, possibly preceded by a communication stage. In case
there is a communication stage, agent i sends a message about the quality of the technology
adopted at site i in period t = 1. The receiver of this message depends on the process
p. We assume that agent i, if and when he sends a message, knows the technology (not
its value) that j has used in t = 1 when he sends a message. This is often the relevant
case, as agents may well be aware that other technologies are used, without knowing their
quality. Hence, a communication strategy pi () is a conditional probability distribution.
Let pi (mijsi; xi;1; Xj;1) be the likelihood that i sends a cheap talk message mi 2 M , where
20What matters for the results is that if i = , member i has a higher likelihood of correctly assessing
the state of the economy than if i = .
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M = [0; 1] is a message space, in case his signal equals si, the observed value ofXi;1 equals xi;1,
and agent j uses technology Xj;1. Next, a decision maker determines which technology Xi;2
is adopted at site i at time t = 2. Who this decision maker is depends on the decision process
p. Let Ipi 2 Ipi be the information this person has at the beginning of the decision-making
stage. It depends on the process p. The decision strategy dpi determines the relationship
between Ipi and the technology adopted at site i.
(i) In case of isolated agents (p=ia), an agent is unaware of other agents addressing the same
problem, and therefore do not communicate. Hence, I iai =

sY ; sZ
	 [0; 1]: the information
i has is his signal and the value of the technology used in t = 1. Agent i decides on Xi;2.
Let diai (si; xi;1) 2 fY; Zg denote the technology that i uses in t = 2 as a function of his
information.
(ii) In case of decentralized learning (p=dl), each agent i simultaneously sends a message mi
to the other agent concerning the value of the technology he has adopted in t = 1. So,
Idli =

sY ; sZ
	 [0; 1]M fY; ZgM . That is, in addition to the information in case of
p=ia, and the message he sends to j, i also knows the technology Xj;1 2 fY; Zg adopted at
the other site, and the message mj 2 M about the value of that technology. Agent i next
decides on Xi;2. Let ddli (si; xi;1;mi; Xj;1;mj) 2 fY; Zg denote the technology that i adopts
in t = 2 given Idli .
(iii) In case of centralized learning (p=cl), each agent i simultaneously sends a message mi
concerning the value of the technology he has adopted in t = 1 to the center.Hence, IclC =
fY; Zg2 M2 represents the centers information set: information about which technology
has been adopted at each site, and a message concerning the value of each technology. Next,
the center decides which technology is adopted at either site. Let dclC (X1;1; X2;1;m1;m2) 2
fY; Zg  fY; Zg denote the correspondence indicating for given technologies used at either
site and for given messages sent by the agents the technology that is used at sites 1 and 2,
respectively in t = 2. As no confusion can arise, we write IC instead of IclC , and dC instead
of dclC .
An agents utility depends on the value of the technology adopted at his site and on
his perceived ability or reputation. This perception is based on the information set 
i;t.
We will say that the market infers an agents reputation from 
i;t. This market could
12
be, e.g., the (internal) labour market or the electoral market. As in Prendergast and Stole
(1996), we assume that perceptions are based on actions (technologies) chosen, not on the
value generated. We distinguish two cases. Say that reputations are locally determined if
the reputation of agent i is based on the technologies used at site i only, 
i;1 = fXi;1g and

i;2 = fXi;1; Xi;2g for i 2 f1; 2g. Instead, say that reputations are globally determined if the
reputation of agent i is based on the technologies used at both sites i and j, 
i;1 = fXi;1; Xj;1g
and 
i;2 = fXi;1; Xj;1; Xi;2; Xj;2g for i 2 f1; 2g. We call (Xi;1; Xj;1; Xi;2; Xj;2) the adoption
vector, indicating which technologies are adopted in t = 1 at sites i and j, and in t = 2 at
sites i and j, respectively. If x is the value of the technology Xi;t that i adopts, then the
period t utility of agent i equals U (Xi;t) = x+^i;t (
i;t), where ^i;t (
i;t) = Pr
 
i = j
i;t

equals the belief that i is highly able conditional on 
i;t, and  > 0 is the relative weight of
reputational concerns. We ignore time discounting. The centers utility equals the sum of
the values of the technologies adopted in t = 2.
Di¤erent decision processes cause di¤erences in behaviour in the second period, but
not in the rst. This will be readily apparent from the analysis in the following sections.
Independent of the decision process, period t = 1 behaviour that maximizes agent is utility
is to follow his signal: Xi;1 = Y if and only if si = sY . This maximizes the expected value of
the technology and minimizes the probability of changing (or having to change) technology
in period 2.
An equilibrium consists of a communication strategy i () for each agent, a belief function
fi (jI) for each decision maker, a decision strategy di () for each decision maker, and ex
post reputations ^i;t (). We use the concept of Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (from now on,
equilibrium) to characterize behaviour. This requires (i) that the communication strategies
are optimal for each type given decision makers strategies and reputations; (ii) that the
decision strategy is optimal given the belief functions and reputations; (iii) that beliefs and
reputations are obtained using Bayes rule. Because of the inherent symmetry, we write
the analysis from the point of view of agent i = 1 and assume that s1 = sY . Of course,
s2 2

sY ; sZ
	
. We ignore babbling equilibria if an equilibrium in which information is
transmitted exists.
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4 Isolated agents
Once agent 1 has followed his signal sY in period 1 and observed value y, he has to decide
whether to continue with his technology. Note that having received sY and next observing
y allows an agent to update the expected value of the other technology,
E

ZjsY ; y = Pr  jsY ; yE ZjsY ; y; + Pr  jsY ; yE [Z] , (1)
where we have used that E

ZjsY ; y;  = E [Z]. Two e¤ects of y can be distinguished. First,
the larger is y, the more likely it is that the agent is highly able and correctly identied
the more valuable technology. This is the Pr
 
jsY ; y term. Second, conditional on the
agent being highly able, a higher value of y increases the expected value of Z. This is the
E

ZjsY ; y;  term. Of course, E ZjsY ; y;   E [Z]. The following lemma summarizes
some characteristics of E

ZjsY ; y.
Lemma 1 The expected value of Z given si = sY and y satises: (a) E

ZjsY ; 0 =
E

ZjsY ; 1 = E [Z], and E ZjsY ; y < E [Z] for y 2 (0; 1); (b) E ZjsY ; y is decreas-
ing in y for y < E

ZjsY ; y, increasing for y > E ZjsY ; y, and y = E ZjsY ; y has a
unique solution.
This lemma is illustrated in Figure 1, panel a. The horizontal line represents the uncon-
ditional expectation E [Z], and the conditional expectation E

ZjsY ; y is a convex function
of y.
Ignore reputational concerns for the moment. Given I ia1 =

sY ; y
	
, the decision strategy
that maximizes the expected value of the technology adopted at site 1 in the second period,
the rst-best strategy, is to stick to the existing technology if and only if y  E ZjsY ; y.
It follows from lemma 1, part (b), and it is clear from Figure 1, panel a, that the rst-best
decision strategy is a single-threshold strategy,
dia1
 
I ia; t

=
8<: Y if y  tZ otherwise,
with t = yFBia and where y
FB
ia solves y
FB
ia = E

ZjsY ; yFBia

.
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Figure 1: Isolated Agents. Panel a depicts the rst-best threshold value; panel b the equilib-
rium threshold value yia for  < ia; panel c reports the equilibrium values for fX = 1 and
 = 1=2. Thus, ia = 1. Note that ^
 is the equilibrium reputational gap.
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Besides being interested in picking the most valuable technology, an agent is also in-
terested in his reputation. Consider a threshold decision strategy and any threshold value
t 2 (0; 1). In case of isolated agents, markets only have local knowledge. Let ^ (Y;X1;2; t)
denote the reputation, obtained using Bayesrule, if X1;2 2 fY; Zg, and the agent uses the
threshold t. Then,21
^1 (Y; Y ; t) =
1 + F (t)
1 + F (t)
 >  > ^1 (Y; Z; t) =
F (t)
F (t) + (1  ). (2)
Irrespective of t, continuation commands a higher reputation than switching to the other
technology. Continuation suggests having observed a su¢ ciently high value of y. A highly
able agent is more likely to have implemented a technology that generates a high value than
a less able agent. Hence, as an agent cares about his reputation, he wants to deviate from the
rst-best decision rule by lowering the hurdle that his initial technology should pass for its
continuation. The agent wants to give up technological adequacy for reputational benets.
We will call the di¤erence ^1 (Y; Y ; t)   ^1 (Y; Z; t) the reputational gap. It is the source of
the distortion. Proposition 1 describes equilibrium behaviour of an isolated agent.
Proposition 1 In case of isolated agents, and for  < ia = E [Z] =, there exists an equi-
librium in which the decision strategy is a single-threshold strategy with threshold value yia
21Deriviations can be found in the proof of Proposition 1 in the Appendix.
15
that satises
 [^1 (Y; Y ; y

ia)  ^1 (Y; Z; yia)] = E

ZjsY ; yia
  yia, (3)
with yia 2
 
0; yFBia

. yia is a decreasing function of .
22 For   ia, yia = 0, i.e., agent 1
always continues his initial technology, and ^1 (Y; Y ; 0) =  and ^1 (Y; Z; 0) = 0.
Eq (3) is illustrated in Figure 1, panel b. At the threshold value yia the agent is indif-
ferent between sticking to Y and switching to Z. This can also be seen by rewriting (3)
as yia + ^1 (Y; Y ; y

ia) = E

ZjsY ; yia

+ ^1 (Y; Z; y

ia). The left-hand side equals the value
of continuing with Y if its observed value equals yia, whereas the left-hand side equals the
value of switching technology for the same observed value of Y . It follows from (2) that
the lower yia is, the lower is the reputation the agent commands in case of sticking to the
original technology and in case of switching technologies. If the hurdle for continuation is
lowered, passing the hurdle becomes a less convincing signal of ability. At the same time,
not passing a lower hurdle becomes a stronger signal of incompetence. It can be checked
that the reputational gap increases the lower is yia. As the reputational gap is still strictly
positive for a threshold value equal to zero, it follows from (3) that for   ia yia = 0: the
agent will continue with his initial choice of technology irrespective of its observed value.
Figure 1, panel c illustrates the proposition for a uniform distribution and  = 1=2. It shows
the equilibrium values of yia and ^1 (Y; Y ; y

ia)  ^1 (Y; Z; yia).
5 Decentralized learning
In this section, we assume that the right to decide about the technology to be adopted
in period two remains with the agents. We begin by describing rst-best behaviour in a
decentralized process. In the communication stage each agent truthfully reveals his private
information. Say that 1 truthfully reveals his private information if, for all y 2 [0; 1], and
all X2;1 2 fY; Zg, Pr
 
m1jsY ; y;X2;1

= 1 if m1 = y and Pr
 
m1jsY ; y;X2;1

= 0 otherwise.
22We cannot exclude the possibility of multiple equilibria in general. In case of multiple equilibria, we show
that the highest and the lowest equilibrium values of yia are decreasing functions of . We have established
numerically that in case of the uniform distribution, the equilibrium is unique, in this and all other sections.
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Next, the rst-best decision strategy equals
ddl1
 
Idl1 ; y
FB
S

=
8>>><>>>:
Y if X2;1 = Y and y  yFBS
Y if X2;1 = Z and y  z
Z otherwise,
where yFBS satises y
FB
S = E

ZjsY ; sY ; yFBS

. That is, if both agents adopted the same
technology, each agent should continue this technology if its value is larger than yFBS .
23 If
instead agents adopted di¤erent technologies, they should next choose the one with superior
performance. In 5.1 we study equilibrium behaviour in case reputations are locally deter-
mined, and in 5.2 we turn to reputations that are globally determined. In 7.1, we compare
the performance of decentralized learning under both types of reputation formation.
5.1 Locally determined reputations
Can truthful revelation be part of an equilibrium? With agent 1s reputation independent
of what the other agent decides, and with agent 1 being free to choose what technology to
adopt in t = 2, truthful revelation of the technologys value is an equilibrium communication
strategy for each agent24. Absent any motive to inuence the other agent, the quality of the
information exchange is high.
Once communication has taken place, each agent independently decides whether to con-
tinue with his original technology or to switch to the other technology. Let a double-threshold
strategy ddl1
 
Idl1 ; tS; tD

with thresholds (tS; tD) = 0 be dened as
ddl1
 
Idl1 ; tS; tD

=
8>>><>>>:
Y if X2;1 = Y and y  tS
Y if X2;1 = Z and y  m2   tD
Z otherwise.
That is, agent 1 continues with his original technology Y (i) if both agents used the same
technology and its value exceeds tS; or (ii) if the agents used di¤erent technologies, but the
23Of course, the fact that both experts used the same technology in the rst period bodes well for the
superiority of this technology: yFBS < y
FB
ia .
24In fact, it is payo¤ irrelevant, both directly (cheap talk) and indirectly, as 2s actions do not a¤ect 1s
payo¤.
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other technology is either less valuable or its superior performance does not exceed by a
margin larger than tD the value of the current technology. Let ^1 (Y;X; tS; tD) denote 1s
reputation if he uses the double-threshold strategy, and adopts X1;2 = X 2 fY; Zg in period
2.
To see that an agent wants to distort the decision on X1;2, suppose 1 were to use the
rst-best threshold values, (tS; tD) =
 
yFBdl ; 0

. If 1 continues with his initial technology,
the market deduces that either the same technology was used at the other site and its
observed value exceeded yFBdl , or that the other site used the other technology which proved
to be of inferior quality. Either event strengthens 1s reputation. Analogously, discontinuing
a technology hurts a reputation. As a result, reputational concerns induce an agent to
distort the decision in t = 2. If both agents adopted Y in t = 1, then agent 1 sticks
to this technology if and only if y + ^1 (Y; Y ; tS; tD)  E

ZjsY ; sY ; y + ^1 (Y; Z; tS; tD).
Similarly, in case agents adopted di¤erent technologies, agent 1 wants to continue with Y i¤
y + ^1 (Y; Y ; tS; tD)  z + ^1 (Y; Z; tS; tD). Proposition 2 describes equilibrium behaviour.
Note that lo stands for locally determined reputations.
Proposition 2 Dene lodl = E [Z] =^1 (Y; Y ; 0; E [Z]) and 
lo
dl = 1=. In case of decentral-
ized learning and locally determined reputations, an equilibrium exists in which
(i) truthful revelation is the communication strategy;
(ii) the belief functions are Pr (x2;1jm2) = 1 for x2;1 = m2 and Pr (x2;1jm2) = 0 for x2;1 6= m2;
(iii) the decision strategy is a double-threshold strategy. For  < lodl, threshold values (t

S; t

D)
satisfy
 [^1 (Y; Y ; t

S; t

D)  ^1 (Y; Z; tS; tD)] = E

ZjsY ; sY ; tS
  tS (4)
 [^1 (Y; Y ; t

S; t

D)  ^1 (Y; Z; tS; tD)] = tD, (5)
with tS 2
 
0; yFBS

and tD 2 (0; 1). For  2 [lodl; lodl), threshold values are (0; tD) and tD
solves ^1 (Y; Y ; 0; tD) = t

D. Finally, for   lodl, threshold values equal (0; 1).
Figure 2, panels a and b show the structure of the equilibrium. For  < lodl, see panel
a and Eqs (4) and (5), in equilibrium the size of the distortions, E

ZjsY ; sY ; tS
   tS and
tD, and the value of the reputational gap,  [^1 (Y; Y ; t

S; t

D)  ^1 (Y; Z; tS; tD)], are the same.
18
The loss in technological value due to the distortion should in either case be compensated by
the same boost in reputation. At  = lodl, t

S = 0, and t

D = E [Z]. Then, the market infers
from observing (Y; Z) that agents initially used di¤erent technologies and y < z, and so 1
initially picked the inferior technology, ^1 (Y; Z; 0; E [Z]) = 0. Also, ^1 (Y; Y ; 0; E [Z]) > 
as the market infers from (Y; Y ) that either both agents initially received sY , or that the
other agent received sZ but y  z   tD. Either possibility boosts agent 1s reputation. It
follows from (4) that lodl = E [Z] =^1 (Y; Y ; 0; E [Z]) < E [Z] =.
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Figure 2: Decentralized learning and locally determined reputations. Panels a and b depict the
structure of equilibrium. Panel c reports equilibrium threshold values and the reputational
gap for the uniform distribution and  = 1=2. Hence, lodl < 1 and 
lo
dl = 2.
For  2 [lodl; lodl), illustrated in panel b, if 1 learns that 2 used the same technology, he
continues his initial technology irrespective of its value y, tS = 0, whereas if 1 learns that 2
used a di¤erent technology, 1 may still change technology. For   lodl, 1 sticks to his initial
technology Y , irrespective of its value y, and regardless of what 2 reports, (tS; t

D) = (0; 1).
Then ^1 (Y; Y ; 0; 1) =  as continuation of Y does not reveal any information on ability,
while ^1 (Y; Z; 0; 1) = 0 is a plausible out-of-equilibrium belief. Hence, 
lo
dl = 1=. Panel c
illustrates the reputational gap and the threshold values for the uniform distribution and
 = 1=2. The reputational gap rises for  < lodl to ^1 (Y; Y ; 0; E [Z]) > , and declines to 
for lodl <   lodl.
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5.2 Globally determined reputations
We start by showing that rst-best behaviour, described on page 17, is not equilibrium
behaviour. Suppose imputed equilibrium behaviour is rst-best behaviour. Then, if agents
initially adopted di¤erent technologies, the only adoption vectors possible are (Y; Z; Y; Y )
and (Y; Z; Z; Z). The inference the market draws from the rst (resp. second) vector is
that Y (resp. Z) is the superior technology, and that 1 made the correct (resp. wrong)
choice. The correct choice can be thanks to skill, or due to low ability and luck. The wrong
choice, by contrast, must be due to low ability. Hence25, ^1 (Y; Z; Y; Y ) = 21+ >  and
^1 (Y; Z; Z; Z) = 0. Clearly, from a reputational point of view, the former is the best and
the latter is the worst that could happen to agent 1. Could 1 convince 2 to adopt his
technology? Rather than truthful revelation, consider the following unilateral deviation
strategy in case of di¤erent initial technologies: send m1 = 1 independent of y, and in the
decision stage stick to Y if and only if y  m2.The e¤ect of this deviation strategy is that
1 convinces 2 to adopt Y in t = 2. Whether 1 continues with Y depends on the reported
value m2 and y. For y  m2, the adoption vector in t = 2 becomes (Y; Z; Y; Y ), the same as
it would have been had 1 stuck to truthful revelation. If y < m2, the adoption vector in case
of the deviation strategy equals (Y; Z; Z; Y ), whereas in case of truthful revelation it would
have been (Y; Z; Z; Z). The reputation implied by such a deviation is not determined by the
imputed equilibrium behaviour. However, it is consistent with the model to assume that,
given any adoption vector, any increase in the use at t = 2 of the technology 1 adopted in
t = 1 does not decreases the reputation of 1.
Assumption 1 Consider any adoption vector with X1;1 = Y . The reputation of 1 does
not decrease if 1 (resp. 2) changes from X1;2 = Z to X1;2 = Y (resp. from X2;2 = Z to
X2;2 = Y ).
With this assumption, the deviation is advantageous in terms of reputation, and costless
in terms of technical adequacy. We have proved the next Lemma.
Lemma 2 First-best behaviour is not equilibrium behaviour in case of decentralized learning
with globally determined reputations.
25See the proof of Proposition 3.
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The above line of reasoning can be applied to any imputed equilibrium in which, in case
agents started by adopting di¤erent technologies, 2s decision regarding X2;2 depends on the
message m1 of 1. The protable deviation is then for 1 to send the message that induces 2
to adopt Y , and to continue to base his own decision for t = 2 on a comparison of y and
the expected value of Z given m2. This shows that the unique equilibrium communication
strategy in case X2;1 = Z is a pooling strategy.26 The interest an agent has to convince
the other to agent to switch technology destroys all meaningful communication. This is in
line with one of the concerns expressed about the OMC in the EU, a case of a decentralized
learning process with globally determined reputations.
In case agents initially adopted the same technology, Y , it is easy to see that truthful
revelation is an equilibrium strategy. Communication is also irrelevant.27 Proposition 3
below establishes that in this case an agent wants to deviate from rst-best behaviour in the
decision stage.
As communication breaks down in case of di¤erent initial technologies, and is irrelevant
in case of the same initial technology, the equilibrium decision strategy of 1 amounts to a
comparison of y with a cut-o¤ value that depends on the number of agents that used the
same technology in t = 1. Let a double-cut-o¤ strategy with cut-o¤s (cS; cD) = 0 be dened
as
ddl1
 
Idl1 ; cS; cD

=
8>>><>>>:
Y if X2;1 = Y and y  cS
Y if X2;1 = Z and y  cD
Z otherwise.
Of course, conditional on the information exchanged, the values of cS and cD that would
maximize the technological value are cS = yFBS , and cD = E [Z].
28 The next Proposition
describes equilibrium behaviour. Note that gl stands for globally determined reputations. 29
26To avoid a discussion of out-of-equilibrium beliefs, we assume that each agent uses a probability distrib-
ution over the full support [0; 1] that is independent of the value x he observed. We refer to this equilibrium
communication strategy simply by pooling strategy.
27This is so as in our model technologies have a common value that is learned before agents communicate
in t = 2.
28Note that E

ZjsY ; sZ ; y = E [Z].
29In what follows, we assume that the out-of-equilibrium belief ^1 (Y; Y; Z; Y ) equals ^1 (Y; Y; Z; Z).
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Proposition 3 Dene gldl = E [Z]
1+2
(1+)
and gldl = E [Z]
1+

. In case of decentralized learn-
ing with globally determined reputations, there exists an equilibrium in which
(i) the communication strategy is (a) a pooling strategy if initial technologies di¤er, and (b)
truthful revelation if initial technologies are the same;
(ii) the belief function equals (a) the density f1
 
zjIdl1

= f (z) for all z and m2 in case
X2;1 = Z; and (b) discrete probabilities in case X2;1 = Y , Pr (yjm2) = 1 for y = m2 and
Pr (yjm2) = 0 for y 6= m2;
(iii) the decision strategy is a double-cut-o¤ strategy. The cut-o¤ value in case initial tech-
nologies are the same, cS, satises
 [^1 (Y; Y; Y; Y ; c

S)  ^1 (Y; Y; Z; Y )] = E

ZjsY ; sY ; cS
  cS, (6)
with cS 2
 
0; yFBS

for  < gldl. c

S is a decreasing function of .
30 For   gldl, cS = 0. The
cut-o¤ value in case initial technologies di¤er, cD, satises


1 + 
= E [Z]  cD; (7)
with cD 2
 
0; yFBD

for  < gldl. c

D is a decreasing function of . For   gldl, cD = 0.
Figure 3, panels a and b correspond to (6) and (7), respectively.
Panel c shows the equilibrium values in case of fX = 1 and  = 1=2. Eq (7) shows
that if agents adopted di¤erent technologies in t = 1, then the reputational gap is a constant
function of cD. To understand why, recall that ability means the ability to identify the better
technology. When the market observes that agents initially used di¤erent technologies, the
agentschoices in t = 2 either allow the market to infer who used the better and the worse
technology (i.c., (Y; Z; Z; Z) and (Y; Z; Y; Y )) or does not allow the market to infer any in-
formation on the relative performance of the technologies (i.c., (Y; Z; Y; Z) and (Y; Z; Z; Y )).
The value of cD does not provide additional information on an agents ability. Of course, if
the market observes that agents initially adopted the same technology, ^1 (Y; Y; Y; Y ; cS) does
depend on the cut-o¤ value: the lower is cS, the lower is the reputation an agent commands
in case of continuation.
30The remark made in footnote 22 applies.
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Figure 3: Decentralized learning and globally determined reputations. Panels a and b depict the
structure of equilibrium. Panel c reports equilibrium cut-o¤ values and reputational gaps for
fX = 1 and  = 1=2. ^1 (S) denotes ^1 (Y; Y; Y; Y ; cS) ^1 (Y; Y; Z; Y ), and^1 (D) = 1+ .
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In case reputations are globally determined, there are two reputational gaps. In panel c,
^1 (S) is the reputational gap in case both agents started with Y . Starting with the same
technology is a good sign for each agents ability. Thus, even if  increases and cS goes to
zero ^1 (Y; Y; Y; Y ; cS) > . On the other hand, the lower is c

S, the more switching indicates
a poor choice in period 1. The net e¤ect is that the gap increases in , see the proof. In
case reputations are locally determined, there is a single reputational gap, see the left-hand
sides of (4) and (5) in Proposition 2.
6 Centralized learning
Now we turn to the case where the local agents who gained experience in period one do not
have the right to decide on the technology to be adopted in period two; instead, the centre
decides. First-best behaviour in the case of a centralized learning process is for each agent
to truthfully reveal his private information, and for the center next to pick the technology
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with the higher, reported or expected, value:
dC
 
IC ; y
FB
S

=
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
Y; Y if X2;1 = Y and m1  yFBS
Z;Z if X2;1 = Y and m1 < yFBS
Y; Y if X2;1 = Z and m1 > m2
Z;Z otherwise.
We start by showing that rst-best behaviour is not equilibrium behaviour in case of cen-
tralized learning.
Lemma 3 Under centralized learning, an equilibrium in which agents truthfully reveal their
private information does not exist, neither in case of locally nor in case of globally determined
reputations.
It su¢ ces to show that agent 1 has an incentive to slightly exaggerate the value of Y in
case j adopted a di¤erent solution. If agents and planner were to stick to rst-best behaviour,
then an agent commands a higher reputation if he is allowed to continue with hissolution
than if he is forced to change. If reputations are determined locally, ^1 (Y; Y ) > ^1 (Y; Z),
while if they are determined globally ^i (Y; Z; Y; Y ) > ^i (Y; Z; Z; Z). In either case, assume
i deviates by communicating a slightly exaggerated value of his technology, y+" > y instead
of y, with " > 0. Conditional on this exaggeration changing the planners decision i.e., for
z 2 (y; y + "), the benets equal  [^i (Y; Z; Y; Y )  ^i (Y; Z; Z; Z)] > 0 and are independent
of ", whereas the costs can be made arbitrarily small by reducing the value of ". This shows
that a protable deviation from rst-best behaviour exists.
Of course, in equilibrium an agent cannot systematically exaggerateas then the center
could simply undo the exaggeration. Instead, as in Crawford and Sobel (1982), in equilibrium
information is lost as the agent adds noise to his message: he partitions the space of possible
technology values [0; 1] into intervals, and reports only to which interval the value of his
technology belongs. That is, he ranks its value, and the number of intervals equals the
number of possible ranks.
Let a (N)  (a0 (N) ; : : : ; aN (N)) denote a partition of [0; 1] in N intervals, with 0 =
a0 (N) < a1 (N) <    < aN (N) = 1. Agent 1 is said to use a partition strategy to
communicate if there exists a tuple (N; a (N)), such that p1
 
m1jsY ; y;X2;1

is uniform,
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supported on [ar (N) ; ar+1 (N)] if y 2 (ar (N) ; ar+1 (N)) for r = 0; : : : ; N   1.31 We focus
on the highest value of N consistent with incentives. Say that agent 1 sends inuential
information (or that communication is inuential) if there are two messages m1 and m01
about Y and a message m2 about Z such that dC (m1;m2) = Y with probability one and
dC (m
0
1;m2) = Z with probability smaller than one. That is, the agent uses at least two
ranks, N  2. To save space, we write a instead of a (N) if this does not lead to confusion.
Does an agent truthfully report the value of his technology to the center if the other agent
uses the same technology in t = 1? Agent is interest are di¤erent from those of the center,
but identical to those of the agent j. This o¤ers room for the agents to (tacitly) collude, and
to induce the center to choose the technology they deem best. Each can send either of two
messages, one such that the center will next decide that the technology is su¢ ciently good
to merit continuation, and one inducing the center to force the agents to switch. Note that
collusive behaviour of this sort seems easy to sustain as there is no asymmetric information
among the agents.32 Although this is a partition strategy with N  2, to distinguish it from
the more general partition strategy in case agents use di¤erent technologies, we refer to it
as a collusion strategy. It is completely characterized by a single value, yS 2 [0; 1], for which
an agent is indi¤erent between sending one message rather than the other.
Let the center choose the technology that is the better one given the messages of the
agents. In case they rank di¤erent technologies the same, the center is indi¤erent and tosses
a coin. Even if both agents report on the same technology, the center may still decide to
31Note that between any two partitions the expert uses a random strategy. This guarantees that in
equilibrium any possible message is sent with strictly positive probability. A discussion of out-of-equilibrium
beliefs (what should the planner think about the value of a technology if he were to observe a non-equilibrium
message?) can thus be avoided.
32In a previous version of this paper we show that truthfully revealing information to the center in case
agents use the same technology can be part of equilibrium. However, it amounts to playing a weakly
dominated strategy, an unlikely candidate to describe agentsbehaviour.
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make them switch to the other technology. Formally,
dC (IC) =
8>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>:
Y; Y if X2;1 = Y and E [Y jmmin]  E [Zjmmin]
Z;Z if X2;1 = Y and E [Y jmmin] < E [Zjmmin]
Y; Y if X2;1 = Z and E [Y jIC ] > E [ZjIC ]
Y; Y if X2;1 = Z and E [Y jIC ] = E [ZjIC ] and coin = Y
Z;Z otherwise,
(8)
where coin= Y means that the center ips a fair coin with faces Y and Z, and Y comes
up, and where mmin := min [m1;m2] is the lower valued message sent concerning the same
technology. The contents of these messages what they imply concerning the expected
value of the technology are the same if m1;m2 2 [ar 1; ar) and they di¤er if m1 < ar 
m2 for some r.33 To state the belief function of the center, dene a truncated density as
follows: Tr (x; ar; ar+1) = g (x) = (F (ar+1)  F (ar)), where g (x) = f (x) for x 2 [ar; ar+1]
and g (x) = 0 everywhere else. The next proposition characterizes equilibrium behaviour.
Proposition 4 Dene locl = E [Z]
(3+2)(1+)
42
and glcl = E [Z]
1+2
(1+)
. In case of centralized
learning, there exists an equilibrium in which
(i) the centers decision strategy is as dened in (8).
(ii) the communication strategy is (a) a partition strategy (N; a) if initial technologies
di¤er, and (b) a collusion strategy yS if initial technologies are the same;
(ii) the centers belief function is (a) f1 (xi;1jIC) = Tr
 
xi;1; a

r; a

r+1

for mX1 2
 
ar; a

r+1

for
r = 0; : : : ; N 1 if initial technologies di¤er, and (b) f1 (yjIC) = Tr (y; 0; yS) for mY1 2 [0; yS]
and f1 (x1;1jIC) = Tr (y; yS; 1) for mY1 2 (yS; 1] if initial technologies are the same;
(iii) in case of locally determined reputations, the partition a and the collusion strategy
yS = y
lo
S satisfy


^
 
Y; Y ; yloS ; a
  ^  Y; Z; yloS ; a = E Zjar 1  z  ar+1  ar (9)


^
 
Y; Y ; yloS ; a
  ^  Y; Z; yloS ; a = E ZjsY ; sY ; yloS   yloS (10)
33Note that we assume that the planner tosses a coin in case of X2;1 = Z and E

Y jIclC

= E

ZjIclC

. This
ensures harmonisation - sites adopt the same technology in t = 2. In a companion paper we analyse the
case where both sites can continue with their initial technologies. This has interesting consequences for the
nature and quality of communication.
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for r = 1; : : : ; N   1. For  < locl, N  2 and yloS > 0, whereas for   locl, N = 1 and
yloS = 0. That is, the agents do not send inuential information on y and z for   locl.
(iv) in case of globally determined reputations, the partition a satises
 [^1 (Y; Z; Y; Y ; a
)  ^1 (Y; Z; Z; Z; a)] = E

Zjar 1  z  ar+1
  ar (11)
for r = 1; : : : ; N   1. The collusion strategy yS = yglS satises

h
^

Y; Y; Y; Y ; yglS

  ^

Y; Y; Z; Z; yglS
i
= E
h
ZjsY ; sY ; yglS
i
  yglS . (12)
Moreover, for any nite , N  2. For  < glcl yglS > 0, whereas for   glcl yglS = 0.
That is, in case agents initially used di¤erent strategies, agents send inuential information
about y and z for any nite . If agents initially used the same technology, they do not send
inuential information about the technologys values for   glcl.
In case agents used di¤erent technologies, the communication strategy is a partition
strategy. Eqs (9) and (11) determine the partitioning in case of local and global markets,
respectively. If agent 1 observes a value y he has to decide how to rank his technology. The
higher the rank is, the more likely it becomes that the center chooses his technology. This
suggests that his technology is the better one. As a result, agent 1 enjoys a reputational
benet. Ranking it highly also has a cost. If z > y but agent 2 does not rank Z as highly
as 1 ranks Y , the center forces both agents to choose Y , the inferior technology in period 2.
This possibility stops the agent from ranking his technology too highly. The left-hand sides
of the equations state the net reputational value of continuing with ones technology. For
y = ar, this gain is exactly o¤set by a loss in expected project value due to continuation:
the agent is indi¤erent between using two adjacent ranks (messages) to describe the value of
technology Y . Sending one message rather than the other changes the choice of the center
only for z 2  ar 1; ar+1, see the right-hand side of (9) and (11).
In terms of informativeness, a partition strategy is in between the truthful revelation that
characterizes communication in case of a decentralized with locally determined reputations
and the absence of communication in case of decentralized process and globally determined
reputations. That is, as a result of the move from decentralized learning to centralized learn-
ing communication deteriorates in the former case but improves in the latter. In the former
27
case, the loss of an agents decision-making power and its uploading to the center means that
an agent starts to use his communication to indirectly inuence the perception of his ability.
The quality of communication drops. In case of globally determined reputations, the loss of
decision-making power makes that an agent becomes cautious when communicating: given
the communication strategy of the other agent, his own exaggerated claims are no longer
costless but can lead to an inferior choice at the agents own site.
To explain why inuential communication among agents and centre remains possible for
any nite  in case reputations can be based on comparisons across sites but vanishes for
  locl in case of locally determined reputations, it is useful to start by comparing the present
model with the existing literature that uses cheap talk. As noted in the related literature
section, the existing literature focuses on situations in which the di¤erence in preferences
between Sender (S, here agent) and Receiver (R, here center) is exogenously given. Consider
the leading example introduced by Crawford and Sobel, the uniform quadratic case, in which
US (d; y) =   (d  (y + b))2 and UR (d; y) =   (d  y)2 with y 2 [0; 1] being the state variable
that is known to S only, d 2 [0; 1] the decision that is taken by R. The parameter b > 0
captures the di¤erence in preference between S and R. Its exogenously specied value
determines the maximum number of intervals (ranks) in the communication strategy of S,
and, for a given N , the vector a (N). In our model, the di¤erence in preference equals
^ (), where ^ () is determined in equilibrium. This endogeneity may make that agents
send relevant information about the state for any nite . Indeed, proposition 4, part iv
states that agents send relevant information about the technologys values for any nite 
in case they started out with di¤erent technologies and markets are global.
This di¤erence is illustrated in Figure 4. Panel a shows the determination of the equilib-
rium value a1 in the uniform-quadratic case of Crawford and Sobel. For N = 2, the value of
a1 solves a1 =
1
2
  2b, see e.g. Gibbons (1992, p. 216). This equality can also be written as
b =
1
2

1
2
  a1

. (13)
The LHS captures the di¤erence in preference alignment. It determines the equilibrium value
a1. The LHS (RHS) of (13) is plotted as a dotted (drawn) line in panel a. For the Sender
to send relevant information b < 1=4 must hold.
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Figure 4: Determination of the partition in the communication strategy. Communication
limited to at most two ranks. Panel (a) shows the canonical uniform-quadratic case of
Crawford and Sobel. Panel (b) shows the case of centralized learning from others and globally
determined reputations.
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Panel b shows the determination of the equilibrium value a1 in case communication
between the agents and center is limited to at most two ranks and reputations are determined
globally. With at most two ranks, (11) reduces to34

4
1 + 
F (a1) (1  F (a1)) = E [Z]  a1. (14)
The dotted lines represent the LHS for various values of . The reputational gap, the source
of the di¤erence in preference alignment, depends on the equilibrium value a1 and equals
zero for a1 = 0. The drawn line graphs the RHS. The graphs illustrates that for any nite
, there is a unique a1 > 0. That is, for any nite weight  that the agent puts on his
reputation, the agent uses (at least) two ranks.
The key to understand why communication among agents and centre remains possible
for any nite  is the fact that the reputational gap equals zero for a1 = 0. If agents
use di¤erent technologies and a1 = 0, the center decides on the technology that is to be
used in t = 2 by tossing a coin. With globally determined reputations, it is known that
the initial distribution of technologies equaled Y; Z. As a result, the decision of the center
does not add any information on the relative values of the technologies nor on the ability
of the agents. Hence, ^1 (Y; Z; Y; Y ; a1 = 0) = ^1 (Y; Z; Z; Z; a1 = 0). Instead, with locally
34See the proof of Proposition 4.
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determined reputations, relevant communication about the value of a technology is not
possible for   locl as even for a1 = 0 (i.e., one rank only) and yloS = 0 the reputational
gap does not vanish but equals 4
2
(3+2)(1+)
.35 The reason is that it is not known whether
agents initially used the same technologies or di¤erent ones. If an agent is forced to change
technology, it is inferred that agents must initially have used di¤erent technologies and that
next the center tossed a coin. The deduced di¤erence in initial technology hurts an agents
reputation. If instead an agent must continue his initial technology this may also mean that
both agents initially used the same technology. The latter makes it more likely that the
agents received a correct signal. As a result, continuation boosts an agents reputation, and
the reputational gap continues to exist even for a1 = 0.
7 Welfare Comparisons
What are the consequences of the assignment of decision rights? Does it depend on the
information on which reputations are based? We consider for each process the expected
value of the technology that is in use at site 1 in period 2, assuming that 1 starts with Y ,
E

X1;2jsY ; ; 

. The expectation is taken over y, and before 1 knows agent 2s technology
in period 1, assuming of course equilibrium behaviour. The theoretical maximum value
is E [Y jy > z], which obtains if agent 1 chooses the better technology in period 2 with
probability one. No process generates this value, unless  = 1 in which case the better
technology is identied in t = 1. Absent perverse behaviour, the theoretical minimum value
is E [Y jy > z] + (1  )E [Y ]. This is the expected value in case the technology adopted
at site 1 in t = 2 equals the rst period choice with probability one, independent of the
experience gained with the technologies in t = 1 throughout the economy.
To focus on di¤erences in value creation thanks to learning from own past behaviour and
from the experience of others, we transform E

X1;2jsY ; ; 

using the following formula,
W (; ) =
E

X1;2jsY ; ; 
  (E [Y jy > z] + (1  )E [Y ])
E [Y jy > z]  (E [Y jy > z] + (1  )E [Y ])  100%. (15)
That is, W (; ) 2 [0%; 100%] captures value creation thanks to learning, over and above
35For the derivation, see the proof of Proposition 4.
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the minimum value, as a percentage of what is maximally attainable. We refer to it as
welfare.
7.1 Decentralized learning: welfare comparisons
In this subsection, we compare with each other isolated agents, decentralized learning with
locally determined reputations, and decentralized learning with globally determined reputa-
tions. Key to welfare comparisons are (i) the information agents have, and (ii) the degree
to which they use it in the various situations. Consider (i). By denition, an isolated agent
only knows the value of his own technology, and does not know what technology has been
adopted at the other site. We know from Propositions 2 and 3 that in case of decentralized
learning and globally determined reputations for any  > 0 agent 1 also knows X2;1 (but
not x2;1 if X2;1 = Z), and that if reputations are locally determined he knows both X2;1 and
x2;1. If an agent does not care about his reputation, additional information can only lead to
an increase in welfare. This implies that there is some 1 > 0 such that for all  2 (0; 1)
additional information is also welfare-enhancing: Wia (; ) < W
gl
dl (; ) < W
lo
dl (; ).
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Consider (ii). Propositions 13 show that the degree to which information is used depends
on the strength of reputational concerns. In particular, they establish for the three cases
the values of  above which an agent ignores all information and simply continues with
his initial choice of technology. These values are ia = E [Z] =, 
lo
dl = 1=, and 
gl
dl =
E [Z] (1 + ) = for an isolated agent, an agent under a decentralized process and locally
determined reputations, and an agent under a decentralized process and globally determined
reputations, respectively. As ia < 
lo
dl;

gl
dl, an isolated agent stops using information for
a lower value of  than a decentralized agent.37 Furthermore, gldl < 
lo
dl if and only if
E [Z] (1 + ) < 1. If this inequality holds, the ordering for su¢ ciently high values of ,
 > 2 for some 2 > 0,38 is the same as for low values of : a decentralized process and
36Recall that ia stands for isolated agents, dl (cl) for decentralized (centralized ) learning, and gl (lo) for
globally (locally) determined reputations.
37Note that the 1 in 
lo
dl = 1= is the upperbound of the support of fX . The inequality therefore holds
independent of the chosen support.
38By continuity, 2 < 
gl
dl.
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locally determined reputations leads to the highest project value, next comes decentralized
learning with globally determined reputations, and isolated agents perform the worst.
To understand the condition E [Z] (1 + ) < 1, it is important to realize that information
has two roles. On the one hand, additional information helps the agent in identifying the
better technology. In case of locally determined reputations, agent 1 knows the value of the
other technology. The di¤erence z   y can be as large as 1. In case of globally determined
reputations, agent 1 does not know the value of the other technology. Instead, he can
only calculate E [Z]   y. This di¤erence is at most E [Z]. Hence, ceteris paribus, for all
information about Z to be ignored and for the agent to continue with Y ,  should be larger
when his reputation is locally determined than when it is globally determined. On the other
hand, additional information helps the market in evaluating an agents ability. If a market
cannot compare across sites, then reputation-wise more is at stake when the agent takes a
decision relative to the case where a market can compare across sites. In the latter case the
market already knows whether agents used the same or di¤erent technologies. If agent 1
were to continue with Y , rather than to switch to Z, independent of what he knows about
Z, then the reputational gap equals  if markets have access to local information only and
= (1 + ) <  if markets can compare across sites. Hence, ceteris paribus,  should be
larger in the latter case than in the former case for information about Z to be ignored and
for the agent to continue with Y . The inequality E [Z] (1 + ) < 1 holds if it is su¢ ciently
hard to identify the better technology ( low), and if the unconditional expected value E [Z]
of a technology is su¢ ciently low. In case of the uniform distribution or any other symmetric
distribution it holds.
In Figure 5, we compare value, as measured byW , for decentralized learning with reputa-
tions that are locally and globally determined and for isolated agents under the assumption
that the value of technology X 2 fY; Zg is uniformly distributed, fX (x) = 1 on [0; 1], and
that  = 1
2
. 39
Figure 5 illustrates a number of points. First, learning from ones own past behaviour
and from others potentially boosts welfare enormously. For  close to zero, an isolated agent
who is of high ability with probability  = 1=2 and learns from his own experience only
39For fX = 1 and  = 1=2, E [Y jy > z] = 2=3 and E [Y jy > z] + (1  )E [Y ] = 7=12.
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Figure 5: W (; ) for isolated agents and for decentralized learning from others with locally
and globally determined reputations. fX = 1 and  = 1=2 such that ia = 1, 
gl
dl = 3=2, and

lo
dl = 2.
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can capture 60% of the increase in expected project value. learning further increases this
percentage. Second, if markets can compare agentsbehaviour across sites, this reduces the
positive e¤ect of learning from others. The main reason is that communication breaks down
when markets can make comparisons. Third, the relative performance does not change in .
Additional calculations (not reported here) show that this is true independent of the value
of . The following Proposition sums up.40
Proposition 5 For any fX and , there exists a 1 > 0 such that Wia (; ) < W
gl
dl (; ) <
W lodl (; ) for all  < 1. Furthermore, for any fX and  such that E [Z] (1 + ) < 1, there
exists a 2 > 0 such that Wia (; ) < W
gl
dl (; ) < W
lo
dl (; ) for all  > 2. If instead fX
and  satisfy 1 < E [Z] (1+), then there exists a 3 > 0 such that Wia (; ) < W lodl (; ) <
W gldl (; ) for  > 3. For fX = 1, the uniform distribution, Wia (; ) < W
gl
dl (; ) <
W lodl (; ) holds for all  and .
7.2 Centralized learning: welfare comparisons
In this subsection, we compare with each other isolated agents, centralized learning with
locally determined reputations, and centralized learning with globally determined reputa-
40If  2


gl
dl;

lo
dl

, thenWia (; ) =W
gl
dl (; ) = 0 < W
lo
dl (; ). If   
lo
dl, then,Wia (; ) =W
gl
dl (; ) =
W lodl (; ) = 0. These cases are ignored in Proposition 5.
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tions. Propositions 1 and 4 allow us to compare welfare W in case of centralized learning
and isolated agents.41
Proposition 6 For any fX and , there exists a 4 > 0 such thatWia (; ) < W locl (; ) ;W
gl
cl (; )
for all  2 (0; 4). Furthermore, for any fX and  there exists a 5 > 0 such that
Wia (; ) < W
lo
cl (; ) < W
gl
cl (; ) for all  > 5. In addition, for fX = 1, the uniform
distribution, Wia (; ) < W
gl
cl (; ) ;W
lo
cl (; ) holds for all  > 0 and .
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Figure 6: W (; ) for isolated agents and for centralized learning from others with locally and
globally determined reputations. W (; ) in case of centralized learning is based on a partition
strategy with at most two ranks. fX = 1 and  = 1=2, such that ia = 1, 
lo
cl = 2
7
16
.
Proposition 6 is illustrated in Figure 6 for the uniform distribution and  = 1=2. We have
imposed that communication with the center is limited to at most two ranks in case agents
initially used di¤erent technologies. Clearly, if agents can learn from others welfare improves.
Because of our limitation to at most two ranks, the graph understates the benets for low
values of . In fact, for  = 0, agents would truthfully reveal their private information
and the performance of a centralized learning process would equal that of a decentralized
learning process. We then know from Figure 5 that W  86% rather than W  68% as
shown in the graph. Note that when markets can compare technologies across sites, the
positive e¤ect of learning further increases, especially for high values of . This stems from
the fact that communication between agents and center remains inuential for any nite 
41If   locl , then, Wia (; ) =W locl (; ) = 0. This case is ignored in Proposition 6.
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in case of globally determined reputations, whereas it dies out for high values of  in case of
locally determined reputations.
7.3 Further comparisons
In the previous two subsections we have analysed how welfare changes if, for a given as-
signment of decision rights, the information on which the perceptions of agents abilities
are based changes from local to global. In this subsection we turn to the complementary
question, and analyse, for a given information base on which reputations can be based, the
conditions that determine whether a decentralized process or a centralized process performs
best.
If reputations are locally determined, the learning process that is best depends funda-
mentally on the parameters of the model.42
Proposition 7 Suppose
1
E [Z]
>
(3 + 2) (1 + )
4
. (16)
Then, in case of locally determined reputations, there exists a 6 < 
lo
cl such that welfare
W (; ) is higher with decentralized than with centralized learning for all  > 6.
If condition (16) is met, there are values of  such that under a decentralized process the
technology adoption decision in t = 2 depends on the observed values y and z, whereas in a
centralized process, agents do not transmit useful information about their technologies. As
a result, expected welfare is higher in case of decentralized learning.
Note that (3 + 2) (1 + ) =4 > 2 for all . 1=E [Z] is the ratio of the upperbound of
the support and the expected value of the technology. Hence, the ratio should exceed 2 for
there to be values of  such that a decentralized process outperforms a centralized one for
high values of . The uniform distribution cannot meet this condition. Does this mean that
welfare is higher under a centralized process than under a decentralized process in case of
the uniform distribution for all  and ? The next proposition provides su¢ cient conditions
on  and  such that a decentralized process outperforms a centralized process.
42If   locl , then W lodl (; ) =W locl (; ). This case is ignored in Proposition 7.
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Proposition 8 Assume reputations are locally determined and technology values are uni-
formly distributed. Then, for any  there are values of ,  2  () ;  (), with 0 <
 () <  (), such that welfare W (; ) is higher under decentralized than under centralized
learning.
What learning process is best if reputations can also be based on comparisons across sites?
Proposition 9 In case of globally determined reputations, and for any fX , , and , welfare
W (; ) is higher with centralized than with decentralized learning.
The main benet of moving from a decentralized process to a centralized one in case
reputations can also be based on comparisons across sites is the restoration of communication
when agents initially used di¤erent technologies. The proof establishes that even if agents in a
centralized learning process were to limit themselves to a communication strategy consisting
of at most two ranks - and choose a1 optimally - welfare goes up. This suggests that the
welfare di¤erence can be substantial for low values of , as such values allow for richer
communication (i.e., ner partitions).
8 Concluding Remarks
An important objective of this paper was to gain insight into the e¤ects of alternative
learning processes on the quality of decisions in situations where information is dispersed
among agents, and agents are concerned about their reputations. Our analysis focuses on
two broad features of decision-making processes: the extent of a centralized process and
whether reputations of decision-makers are based on local information only, or can also be
based on comparisons across sites. We believe that our focus enabled us to derive a couple
of interesting results. By focusing on these two broad features, we have abstracted from
other features of learning processes. Here we would like to elaborate on some of the specic
assumptions we have made.
Centralization. One important assumption is that in a centralized process the center
always acts in the general interest. In reality, there is little reason to put so much condence
in central bodies. For example, a center may be biased towards one of the technologies
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because of favoritism. Alternatively, a center may be biased because somehow its name is
connected to one of the technologies. Of course, our assumption of a "benevolent" center
provides too favourable a picture of centralized processes.
Information. We have described the private information that agents have as non-veriable,
and communication as cheap talk. Although this may well reect an important part of
information agents have gained locally, they may also have veriable information. Such
information can be checked by other agents. If it is unknown whether an agent actually
possesses information that is decision-relevant to another agent, the former may have an
incentive to selectively withhold his private information from the latter, see e.g. Milgrom
and Roberts (1986). How does the presence of veriable information change our ndings?
Although the nature of information manipulation changes, the incentives to manipulate
continue to be determined by the interplay of the decision rights and the information on
which reputations are based. As a result, the quality of information exchange depends in
essentially the same way on these same two factors. Consider decentralized decision-making
with locally determined reputations. The fact that an agents reputation is independent
of what the other agent does and that an agent can decide himself what technology he
uses next makes that revealing all positive and negative pieces of information is a weakly
dominant strategy. If reputations reputations are also based on comparisons across sites
(and decentralised learning), it is important from a reputational perspective to convince the
other agent to switch to your technology. As a result, any negative information will be
withheld. The introduction of centralised decision-making in such a situation gives rise to
the selective revelation of negative information. On the one hand, as the agent at a site
loses decision-making power, he wants to make sure that the center is well-informed. On
the other hand, his reputational concerns imply that he wants the center to impose his
technology at either site. Ceteris paribus, the more damaging negative information is for
the technological value, the more likely it is that the information is revealed. Similarly, the
more damaging negative information is for his reputation, the less likely it becomes that this
information is revealed.
In our model, signals are for free. However, one can easily imagine situations where
agents can increase the probability of receiving an informative signal by putting more e¤ort
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in investigating technologies. We consider modeling agentse¤ort decisions as a promising
extension of our model. We expect that reputational concerns do not only lead to distortions
in communication and decisions, but that they may also induce agents to put more e¤ort in
investigating technologies, see e.g. Suurmond et al. (2004).
Decision rights. We have limited attention to a centralized process and a decentralized
process. A possible third organizational structure is a committee consisting of the two agents
that makes a collective decision in period 2 on the basis of some voting rule. Visser and Swank
(2007) analyze communication and voting in committees in the presence of reputational
concerns.
Our approach is particularly relevant for situations where agents independently gained
experiences that are worth sharing. In our model, period 1 represents history. However, in
other situations experience still has to be gained. Then, some planner could opt for ignoring
signals and assign one technology to agent 1 and the other technology to agent 2. Such a
procedure is likely to weaken reputational concerns as the technology decisions are no longer
linked to signals. Moreover, it allows for learning in period 2. It is easy to show that assigning
technologies in period 1 is optimal if signals are not very informative. The rst-period costs
of ignoring signals are then small.
9 Appendix
Proof of lemma 1: Consider (1) in the text. (a) As Pr
 
jsY ; 0 = 0, E ZjsY ; 0 = E [Z].
Similarly, as Pr
 
jsY ; 1 = 1, then E ZjsY ; 1;  = E [Z], and therefore E ZjsY ; 1 = E [Z].
Moreover, E

ZjsY ; y;  < E [Z] for y 2 (0; 1), as the term on the LHS is the expected value
of the truncated distribution on [0; y). (b) To determine the derivative, use Bayesrule to
write Pr
 
jsY ; y = 2F (y)= (2F (y) + (1  )). Also, E ZjsY ; y;  = R y
0
tf (t) dt=F (y).
One can verify that @ Pr
 
jsY ; y =@y = Pr  jsY ; y  1  Pr  jsY ; y f(y)
F (y)
> 0, and that
@E

ZjsY ; y;  =@y =  y   E ZjsY ; y;  f(y)
F (y)
. Hence,
@E

ZjsY ; y =@y = Pr  jsY ; y f (y)
F (y)
 
y   E ZjsY ; y ,
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from which it follows immediately that E

ZjsY ; y is decreasing for y < E ZjsY ; y and
increasing for y > E

ZjsY ; y. Hence, y = E ZjsY ; y has a unique solution. 
Proof of Proposition 1: First, ^ (Y Y ; t) = Pr
 
jY Y ; t in (2). Use Pr  Y Y j =
Pr
 
y  tj =2 =  1  F (t)2 =2 and Pr (Y Y j) = Pr (y  tj) =2 = (1  F (t)) =2, and ap-
ply Bayes rule (analogously for ^ (Y Z; t). Clearly, for given reputations the equilibrium
strategy is a single threshold strategy with yia satisfying (3). Given this strategy, equi-
librium reputations are as in (2) with t = yia  yFBia . To see that yia is a decreasing
function of  for   ia, dene  := yFBia   yia and ^ := ^ (Y Y )   ^ (Y Z). Then
(;^) 2 L := [0; E [Z]]  [0; 1], and so L is a complete lattice. It follows from Lemma
1 that (3) can be written as  = f1 (^; ). It follows from (3) that the function f1 sat-
ises @f1=@^; @f1=@ > 0, and from (2) that ^ = f2 () is an increasing function of .
Hence, we can apply Theorem 3 in Milgrom and Roberts (1994). The set of xed points
of f : L  R+ ! L is non-empty and equals the set of equilibria, and  = yFBia   yia is
increasing in . Moreover, in case this set is not a singleton, both the highest and the lowest
xed point are increasing in . It is straightforward to check that for   ia, yia = 0.
Proof of Proposition 2: The equilibrium belief functions follow immediately from the
equilibrium message strategies. That the decision strategy is a double-threshold strategy
follows from the analysis preceding the statement of the proposition. Finally, note that for
tS = 0, the RHS of (4) equals E [Z], and therefore t

D = E [Z], and thus  = 
lo
dl. Finally, if
tS = 0 and t

D = 1, ^ (Y Y ; 0; 1) =  (as agent uses pooling strategy) and ^ (Y Z; 0; 1) = 0
(this is an out-of-equilibrium belief, the limit of ^ (Y Z) in case tD " 1) such that for   lodl,
the agents indeed continue with their initial technologies no matter what.
Proof of Proposition 3: First, the reputations. ^1 (Y Y Y Y ; c) = Pr
 
jY Y Y Y ; c. Write
F (c) = F . Use Pr
 
Y Y Y Y j = Pr  Y Y Y Y j; y > z =2 = (1 + ) Pr (y > cjy > z) =4 =
(1 + ) (1  F 2) =4 and Pr (Y Y Y Y j) = (1 + ) (1  F 2) =8 + (1  ) (1  F )2 =8, and so
^ (Y Y Y Y ; c) = (1 + F ) 1+
1+2+2F
 > . Similarly, ^ (Y Y ZZ; c) = F +1
1+(2F 2+). One
can check that ^ (S) := ^ (Y Y Y Y ; c)   ^ (Y Y ZZ; c) is decreasing in c. In particular,
for cS = 0, the gap equals
1+
1+2
. Also, ^1 (Y ZY Y ) = Pr
 
jY ZY Y . From fY; Z; Y; Y g
the market deduces that y > z in case of both rst-best and equilibrium behaviour. Thus,
Pr
 
Y ZY Y j = (1  ) =4 (as 2 =  for X2;1 = Z) and Pr (Y ZY Y j) = (1  ) =8, and ap-
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ply Bayes rule. Finally, ^1 (Y ZY Z) = Pr
 
jY ZY Z. From fY; Z; Y; Zg the market deduces
that (y; z) 2 A := f(y; z) jy; z < cD or y; z > cDg. Use Pr
 
Y ZY Zj = 1 
2
Pr (Ajy > z) 1
2
,
Pr (Y ZY Zj) = 1
2
1 
2
Pr (Ajy > z) 1
2
+ 1
2
1+
2
Pr (Ajz > y) 1
2
, and Pr (Ajz > y) = Pr (Ajy > z)
(as Y and Z are iid), and apply Bayes rule. For given reputations and behaviour of 2, if
y = cD, and if 1 continues Y he gets c

D+Pr (z < c

D) 2= (1 + )+Pr (z  cD)= (1 + ),
whereas switching to Z yields E [Z] + Pr (z < cD)= (1 + ). Equating these expressions,
one obtains (7). It is immediate that cD is a decreasing function of . The comparative stat-
ics result on cS uses Theorem 3 in Milgrom and Roberts (1994), see also proof of Proposition
1. The expressions for gldl and 
gl
dl are then immediate.
Proof of Proposition 4: Assume X1;1 6= X2;1, that the center uses (8), that reputa-
tions are given, and that agent 2 uses the partition strategy (N; a) to communicate
about Z. We show that it is then a best-reply for agent 1 to use a partition strategy
with the same partitions to communicate about Y . We focus on the case of lo, and write
^ (Y;X) instead of ^
 
Y;X; yloS ; a
. Derivations for the gl case are analogous. Let y = ar,
where we have suppressed reference to the number of partitions N . At this value of y, 1
should be indi¤erent between sending some mr+1 2 [ar; ar+1) or some mr 2 [ar 1; ar). If
z < ar 1 or z  ar+1, whether 1 sends mr or mr+1 does not a¤ect the decision of the cen-
ter. Hence, one can limit attention to z 2 [ar 1; ar+1). As E

ZjsY ; sZ ; y = ar

= E [Z],
E

ZjsY ; sZ ; y = ar;   z  

= E [Zj  z  ] for any pair (; ) such that 0   <
  1. Let p (; ) := F ()  F (). Sending mr+1 yields agent 1
p (ar 1; ar) [ar + ^1 (Y Y )] +
1
2
p (ar; ar+1) [ar + ^1 (Y Y )] + (17)
1
2
p (ar; ar+1) [E [Zjar  z < ar+1] + ^1 (Y Z)] ,
whereas mr yields
1
2
p (ar 1; ar) [ar + ^1 (Y Y )] +
1
2
p (ar 1; ar) [E [Zjar 1  z < ar] + ^1 (Y Z)] (18)
+p (ar; ar+1) [E [Zjar  z < ar+1] + ^1 (Y Z)] .
Equating (17) and (18) shows that agent 1 is indi¤erent between sending mr+1 and mr for
y = ar if (9) holds.
If X1;1 = X2;1 = Y , it is straightforward to check that, if agent 2 uses the collusion
strategy, if the centers decision strategy is as stated, and for given beliefs ^, then for agent 1
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a collusion strategy with yloS satisfying (10) is a best-reply. It is straightforward to establish
that the belief function follows from applying Bayesrule to the communication strategies of
the agents, and that the centers decision strategy is a best reply given the belief function.
Consider yloS = 0; a

1 (1) = 0 (a pooling communication strategy). To determine ^ (Y Y ) 
^ (Y Z), use Pr
 
Y Y j = Pr  Y Y j; y > z 1
2
+Pr
 
Y Y j; z > y 1
2
= 1
8
+ 3
8
, and Pr (Y Y j) =
3
8
. Hence, ^ (Y Y ) = 3+
3+2
. Similarly, ^ (Y Z) = 
+1
, such that ^ (Y Y )   ^ (Y Z) =
4
(3+2)(1+)
. The RHS of both (9) and (10) become E [Z]. Hence, this communication
strategy is indeed the equilibrium for   locl.
Now turn to gl. Assume X1;1 = X2;1 = Y . For given parameter values the collusion
strategy is the same as the cut-o¤ strategy in case of dl cum gl. Thus, ^

Y Y Y Y ; yglS = 0

=
(1 + F (0)) 1+
1+2+2F (0)
 =  (1 + ) = (1 + 2), and ^

Y Y ZZ; yglS = 0

= 0, and the RHS
of (12) becomes E [Z] for yglS = 0. Hence, this collusion strategy is indeed the equilibrium
strategy for   glcl.
Now assume X1;1 6= X2;1. Assume N = 2, and dene a := a1. ^1 (Y ZY Y ; a) =
Pr
 
jY ZY Y ; a. Use
Pr
 
Y ZY Y j; a = 1
2
1  
2

Pr (y > a > zjy > z) + Pr (y > z > ajy > z) 1
2
+ Pr (a > y > zjy > z) 1
2

=
1  
4

1
2
+ F (a) (1  F (a))

:
Similarly, Pr
 
Y ZY Y j; a = 1
8
 
4
F (a) (1  F (a)). Hence, ^1 (Y ZY Y ) = 1+
 
1 + 2F (a)  2F (a)2.
Analogously, ^1 (Y ZZZ) = 1+
 
1  2F (a) + 2F (a)2, and the reputational gap becomes
4 
1+
F (a) (1  F (a)). As  4
1+
F (0) (1  F (0)) = 0 < E [Z] and  4
1+
F (E (Z)) (1  F (E [Z])) >
0, for all continuous F and any nite  there is a unique a1 > 0 that satises (11). That is,
for any nite , N  2.
Proof of Proposition 6: Suppose  = 0. Then, Wia (0; ) is equal to W (0; ) in case
one agent reports to the center that y  yFBia or y < yFBia . In case of cl, two agents
reveal information truthfully to the center. By continuity of Wia (; ) and Wcl (; ) in ,
Wia (; ) < Wcl (; ) for all  < 4, for some 4 > 0. The second part of the proposition
follows from the facts that (i) locl > ia (see Propositions 1 and 4), and (ii) for all  agents send
inuential information under cl cum gl. The truth of the nal statement in the proposition
has been veried numerically.
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Proof of Proposition 7: It follows from Propositions 2 and 4 that lodl > 
lo
cl i¤ (16) holds.
The existence of 6 then follows from the continuity of W in .
Proof of Proposition 8: Consider cl, and supposeN = 3. We knowE [Zj0 = a0  z  a2] 
a1 = E [Zja1  z  a3 = 1]   a2 from (9). If two becomes the maximum number of ranks,
then a1 = 0, and so this equality becomes E [Zj0  z  a2] = E [Z]   a2. For any fX , let
a2 < E [Z] denote the unique value of a2 satisfying this equality. Let a

2=3 := (0; 0; a

2; 1).
Hence, (9) and (10) become 
h
^

Y Y ; yloS ; a

2=3

  ^

Y Z; yloS ; a

2=3
i
= E [Z]   a2 and
E

ZjsY ; sY ; yloS
  yloS = E [Z]  a2. There is a unique yloS () that satises the latter equal-
ity. We can then use 
h
^

Y Y ; yloS () ; a

2=3

  ^

Y Z; yloS () ; a

2=3
i
= E [Z]   a2 to nd
 (). For    (), agents use at most two ranks.  () is obtained from our numerical
simulations. We checked the statement for  2 [0:05; 0:95].
Proof of Proposition 9: Fix , ; and fX . Suppose X1;1 = X2;1. A straightforward
comparison of (6) and (12) shows that welfare is the same under dl and cl for all fX , , and
. Now suppose X1;1 6= X2;1. In case of cl and in equilibrium, the more ranks the agents
use, the higher isW . Hence, it su¢ ces to show that the proposition is true if communication
under cl is limited to two ranks. Proposition 4 (iv) shows that an equilibrium with two ranks
exists for all parameter values. This partition is characterized by a1 2 (0; E [Z]). Thus, if
agents rank their technologies di¤erently, the center picks the higher ranked technology.
Given the communication strategies of the agents this technology is indeed the better one.
However, for (y; z) 2 [0; a1]2 and (y; z) 2 [a1; 1]2, both technologies are ranked in the same
way. Hence, the center tosses a fair coin. The inferior technology is chosen half of the time
at both sites. In case of dl, for y < cD  z, the Y -user switches to Z, and the Z-user
continues his technology. Both agents use the superior technology in t = 2. The same
holds, mutatis mutandis, for z < cD  y. However, for (y; z) 2 [0; cD]2, both agents switch,
while if (y; z) 2 [cD; 1]2, both agents continue. In either case, the inferior technology is used
at one site with probability one. Clearly, if a1 = c

D, then cl and dl would yield the same
expected welfare. For given parameter values, they are, however, not the same. cD satises
 
1+
= E [Z]  cD (see (7)), whereas a1 satises  1+4F (a1) (1  F (a1)) = E [Z]  a1 (see
(14)). As 4F (a1) (1  F (a1)) < 1 for all a1, for given parameter values, the reputational
gap in case of cl is smaller than in case of dl. As this gap equals the size of the distortion,
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E [Z]  a1 or E [Z]  cD, cl yields a higher expected welfare than dl.
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